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1. Introduction 
This paper sets out a global overview of trends in the public and private presence in the water sector, to help 
assess the options facing cities which still have problematic private water contracts, such as Jakarta.   
 
The first section presents a general overview of the public-private mix; the status of the private companies, 
including the so-called ‘local’ companies; and the growth of public-public partnerships supporting 
municipally-run water services.  
 
The next section examines the process of termination of private contracts around the world, and the 
negotiating positions and tactics used by companies and public authorities.  
 
The final section examines the problems of the Jakarta contract, and the possible strategies for the city, in the 
light of global trends and experience.  
 
2. Global overview of public and private sectors in water 
2.1. Public and private water services in largest cities in the world 
Water services are owned and run by the public sector in about 90% of the largest 400 cities in the world 
(those with populations over 1million).  The proportion run by the private sector is about 14% in high 
income countries – including the EU, USA, and Japan - and similar in developing countries in Latin 
America, Africa and Middle East. In south Asia there are no examples of privatised water, and in east Asia 
(excluding China) there are only 3 cases, Jakarta, Manila and Kuala Lumpur. The proportion privatised has 
fallen slightly since 2006, the year in respect of which the analysis was carried out, due to the return of 
public sector operators in cities such as Buenos Aires, La Paz, and Paris. 
Chart A. Public and private water operators in 400 largest cities in the world  
Private or public water operators in cities with population over 1 million (October 2006)
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2.2. Multinational retreats and the myth of ‘local’ companies1 
As noted below, the large water multinationals – which effectively means Suez and Veolia – have pulled 
back from the aggressive international expansion which they were pursuing 10 years ago. The companies 
themselves now emphasise that their interest is restricted to certain types of contract – for example 
engineering contracts, especially BOTs – and certain areas, notably the EU, USA, Middle East/North Africa, 
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and China. There remains some activity by these companies in other countries, but nearly all of this is the 
legacy of the earlier years, rather than new contracts.  
 
A PPIAF paper published in 2009 2 claims that there is ‘a new breed of investors’, private water companies 
which are local and not multinationals based in northern countries. 3  But its list of ‘local’ companies fails to 
survive examination, on a number of counts: 
- it includes a number of companies which no longer own or operate the water services listed 
- It includes one 100% public sector company (ONEP, Morocco) and a company which has only 
invested in water in the UK, not in developing countries 
- Some companies are historical oddities which cannot be imitated, such as the Tata ‘company town’ 
in Jamshedpur, India, or WSSA, the company set up in South Africa under the apartheid regime 
- a surprising number are owned by companies or rich individuals based in tax havens thousands of 
miles from the contracts e.g. the Antofagasta contract in Chile 
 
The few cases of actual local or national companies are all, in effect, the various private companies which 
have collected stakes in the former multinational subsidiaries in Argentina, Brazil, or Colombia.  They are 
descendants of the multinationals, with similar performance problems. The largest of them, Latinaguas (in 
Argentina), has been warned, criticised and or fined for underinvestment or poor customer service in 2 of its 
3 concessions, and supported by public subsidies in the third. The private companies – mostly local 
construction companies originally taken on as partners by the multinationals – are not credible sources of 
investment finance, nor are they remotely comparable to the public sector operators of the region as a pool of 
expertise. A detailed presentation and discussion is set out in an earlier PSIRU paper.4  
3. Terminations and renegotiations of private water contracts 
3.1. Problems with privatised water 
Up to 1989 very few cities or countries in the world had privatised water supplies, outside France. The UK 
privatised water in England in 1989, then the World Bank and others encouraged privatisation of water and 
other public services in developing and transition countries. In the early 1990s a number of cities in former 
communist countries in Eastern Europe privatised their water to the English and French water companies, 
followed by cities in Argentina and other Latin American countries.  
 
In the mid to late 1990s some African countries and cities privatised, together with a few Asian cities, 
notably Manila and Jakarta. By 2003, however, it was clear that privatisation was deeply unpopular, 
principally because of the price increases required by the companies. It was also clear that the companies 
were not making the expected investments in extending and improving the networks, nor making the 
expected improvements in efficiency, and the contracts and regulatory systems did not create sufficient 
incentives to do so.  
 
The companies were also failing to make the profits expected by northern investors, and so the companies 
themselves wished to end or renegotiate most of these contracts. For example, Suez in January 2003 
announced that it would withdraw from most developing countries unless they were protected from currency 
risk, financing all investment out of local profits, and providing a reliable short-term cash-flow – failing 
which the company would “prepare to depart”.5  
 
As a result, many of the privatised water contracts were terminated, in most of these cases the service was 
renationalised, and some were renegotiated. 6  In some countries – Uruguay and Netherlands –water 
privatisation was made illegal.  
3.2. Continuing problems with privatised water 
The problems with private water are not just a matter of poorly designed contracts or unsuitable regulatory 
mechanisms, as is sometimes argued. Very similar problems are seen in private water concessions and 
contracts all over the world. They include not only economic problems but public health problems, like the 
loss of piped water in parts of north Jakarta for 6 months in 2007, due to inadequate maintenance of an 
electrical system, caused an outbreak of diarrhoea in which 12 babies died and hundreds were hospitalised.7 
In a wide range of countries, the economic and public service problems continue. 
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3.2.1. Malaysia, Selangor privatised water concession to Syabas (Malaysian company) 
Malaysia is in the process of renationalising its water network. In Selangor province, including Kuala 
Lumpur, the water concession is held by Syabas, owned by the Malaysian private company Puncak Niaga. In 
2009 press reports noted ‘numerous irregularities’, involving accounting and financial devices such as non-
tendered awarding of contracts, and large fixed management fees, as well as high levels of inefficiency:8 
• Awarding 72 percent of contracts worth RM600 million  [US$180m.] without open tender; 
• A discrepancy of RM325 million [US$97.5m.] between the summary of contracts awarded in 2005, 
2006 and 2007 and Syabas’ review document; 
• Spending RM51.2 million [US$15m.] to renovate Syabas headquarters, despite Selangor Water 
Regulatory Department (JKAS) approving only RM23.3 million for the exercise 
• Syabas’ decision to source RM325 [US$97.5m.] worth of pipes from Indonesia instead of locally in 
2005, in breach of finance ministry instructions. 
•  RM5.1 million [US$1.5m.] paid in allowances to its chairman Rozali Ismail (…the 32nd richest man 
in Malaysia) 
• Syabas has a management fee agreement with its parent company Puncak Niaga. Syabas has to pay 
Puncak management fees, amounting to RM8.4 [US$million annually and RM32 million 
[US$9.6m.] since 2005 
• Tariffs charged by Syabas are RM0.77 per cubic meter, more than double the amount of 
RM0.37charged by the public sector water operator in Penang State  
 
3.2.2. USA: Camden, New Jersey: leaking money and water 
Camden County in New Jersey, population about 80,000, is officially the poorest city in the USA. Three 
mayors have been jailed for corruption, most recently Milton Milan in 2001.9 In 2000, Camden privatised its 
water services under a 20-year contract with United Water, a subsidiary of Suez Environnement: the 
company is a major contributor to New Jersey politicians of both parties. In 2009 the state of New Jersey 
conducted a special audit into the water contract. Its findings, reported in November 2009, included:  
 
• The loss of 45 percent of the water due to leakage, overflow, meter inaccuracies and billing errors 
• Camden residents have long complained of poor water quality and brown water from their faucets, 
and inspections by state environmental officials found the potential for contamination in the water 
system is grave 
• Most Camden customers have uncollected balances at least 90 days old, but the company’s account 
records are missing names and addresses, making collection impossible. 
• The city paid $2.2 million in connection with an amendment to the United Water contract, even 
though that amendment was never legally approved by elected officials. 
• A review of 64 “add-on” charges worth $8.3 million found problems with all 64 - including 
payments made without proper authorization. 
• State auditors couldn’t locate 15 of 17 city assets that were supposed to be maintained by United 
Water. The two that it did find, including a water treatment plant with nine vehicles, was virtually 
abandoned and “left to rot,” according to the comptroller. 
• United Water’s record-keeping is so poor that when Camden relied on the company’s list of 
properties with unpaid water bills to sell tax liens in 2003, it had to repurchase liens that should not 
have been sold. That cost the city nearly $72,000. 
• Twenty percent of the city’s fire hydrants need to be replaced, despite a contractual provision that all 
are operable. 
• The company charged the city “administrative fees” not specified in the contract of 12.5 percent, 
even though the work was subcontracted to other companies. 
• Water meters were not calibrated as mandated, causing inaccuracies and forcing the city to lose $1 
million in charges to public entities like the Camden County Jail and the Riverfront State Prison. 
• United Water failed to refund $550,000 owed to city customers.” 10 
 
3.2.3. Gabon: typhoid, underinvestment  
Water has been privatised in Gabon since 1997, under a joint energy and water concession to SEEG, which 
is 51% owned by Veolia.  In January 2010 some districts of Libreville, the capital, still had no water at all, 
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while others faced cuts of up to eight hours a day. The Gabon government warned SEEG that failure to make 
improvements would result in a “sequestration” of the contract, and has ordered an audit of the company. 
The same problems of under-investment have existed for years, despite repeated government complaints: in 
2004 there was an outbreak of typhoid in a town after months without a functioning water supply, and the 
government accused SEEG of “not wanting to invest in the short, the medium or the long term”. In 2005 
SEEG got £25m.from the World Bank’s private sector support arm, the International Finance Corporation, 
but in 2009 there were still repeated, lengthy interruptions to both water and energy services.11 
 
3.2.4. Brussels: Veolia releases sewage into river as bargaining tactic 
Aquiris, a company owned by Veolia Water, has a PPP (technically a BOT concession) to operate a waste 
water treatment plant treating the sewage of the Belgian capital, Brussels. On 8th December 2009, Aquiris 
deliberately stopped treating the sewage and allowed it flow unchecked and untreated into the river Zenne, 
causing an environmental disaster. The action was described by the chief executive of the regional water 
authority as like releasing an atomic bomb.  The action was taken because Aquiris were in a dispute with the 
responsible public authorities. Whatever the rights and wrongs in the dispute, it is hard to imagine that a 
publicly owned and operated company would have stopped the pumps like this.12 
 
3.2.5. Manila: no competition, no sewerage treatment, donor aid for private capacity 
There is a constant process of renegotiation, even in supposedly stable contracts such as those in Manila. In 
the first week of January 2010, the concession of Manila Water, one of the two companies sharing the city’s 
water business, was extended by 15 years, without any competitive tendering, in addition to the original 25 
year period which started in 1997. This means that Manila water’s monopoly in eastern Manila will last at 
least until 2037. 13   
 
In the previous month, Manila water and the other concession holder, Maynilad Water, were jointly fined 
P29.4 million [about US$600,000] for failing to develop sewerage treatment plants despite this having been 
required by a law passed 5 years previously. In January 2010, both companies announced that they were 
appealing against this fine.  
 
On the same day, Maynilad effectively admitted it had no skills or capacity in the field of sewerage,  and 
needed public assistance to learn, when it announced that it would be using donor aid from the USA to pay 
Indah Water Konsortium (IWK) of Malaysia to teach Maynilad about this subject: “exchange best practices 
and learning experiences with the Malaysian firm and improve the Philippine company’s ability to develop 
and implement sewerage and sanitation projects. Another component of the program is to promote the health 
and environmental benefits of being connected to sewer lines. We also want to raise awareness on the 
consequences of indiscriminate dumping of domestic and industrial wastes in rivers and waterways in Metro 
Manila”.14  
 
3.3. Extent of terminations and renegotiations 
The table below sets out 34 known cases in which private water supply contracts have been terminated or 
renegotiated and then wholly or partly sold, (plus two ongoing disputes) together with comments on the 
process, in particular the use of compensation claims by the private companies. 21 of these cases concern 
Suez. 
Table 1.  Water service contracts: terminated, renegotiated, sold  
Status: Expired, Terminated (and renationalised or re-municipalised), Renegotiated, Sold, Current 
 
Argentina  Buenos Aires  2006 Suez  T Compensation claim at ICSID was launched by Suez, then 
dropped to facilitate sale of its shares, now resumed. Lawsuits 
against Suez have been filed in front of Argentine courts by 
individual citizens, civil society organisations and local 
authorities for the poor level of service.  
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Argentina  Buenos Aires 
Province 1 
2002 Enron T Azurix withdrew from the contract accusing the regional 
government of “serious breaches”. An ICSID Tribunal rendered 
an award in 2006 condemning Argentina to pay US$ 165 million 
instead of the US$ 565 million claimed by Azurix. The case is still 
pending and no payment made.  
Argentina  Buenos Aires 
Province 2 
2006 Impregilo T Impregilo filed a compensation claim in front of ICSID and the 
case is still pending. No payment made. 
Argentina  Cordoba  2007 Suez  RS Suez discontinued ICSID proceedings after renegotiating the 
contract with local authorities and transferring its shares to a 
local company. 
Argentina  Mendoza  2009 Enron, 
SAUR 
RT The city council took over the company in 2009 on a ‘temporary’ 
basis, after failure to renegotiate.  SAUR filed a compensation 
claim for US$ 200-300 million to ICSID, suspended the claim and 
then reactivated it. The council is carrying out a financial, 
technical and environmental audit which could lead to 
compensation claims against SAUR and even prison sentences.  
Argentina  Santa Fe  2006 Suez  T After failing to sell its shares to private sector buyers, Suez 
withdrew from the contract. A compensation claim in front of 
ICSID is currently pending.  
Argentina  Tucuman  1998 Veolia T Terminated after consumers stopped paying bills due to serious 
operational failures. An ICSID Tribunal rendered an award in 
2007 condemning Argentina to pay US$ 105 million instead of 
the US$ 375 million claimed by Vivendi. The case is still pending 
due to appeal and no payment made. 
Belize  National 2005 Biwater TS Renationalised by buying shares in BWS from Cascal/Biwater. 
Government then floated BWS for sale to Belize citizens only.  
Bolivia  Cochabamba  2000 Bechtel T The concession was terminated following social unrest. Bechtel 
filed a compensation claim in front of ICSID demanding payment 
of US$ 50 million. Due to pressure from an international civil 
society campaign, Bechtel decided to abandon the claim to 
protect its reputation. The claim was formally settled for a token 
payment of 2 Bolivianos (US$ 0.30).  
Bolivia  La Paz/El Alto 2007 Suez  T The contract was ended after amicable negotiations providing 
for the Bolivian government to assume responsibility for loans, 
amounting to US$ 9.6 million, and pay US$ 5.5 million as 
compensation to Suez.  
Brazil  Guariroba 2006 Suez  S Suez left and sold its shares to a Brazilian operator. No reports 
of compensation.   
Brazil  Limeira  2006 Suez  S Suez left and the company is now wholly owned by a Brazilian 
operator. No reports of compensation.   
Central 
African 
Republic  
Bangui  2001 SAUR T The SAUR contract was terminated 5 years before its expiry. No 
reports of compensation paid.  
Chile  Calama 2006 Biwater TS BOT.  Regulator SISS stops payments to wastewater treatment 
BOT because of bad performance. Contract was terminated and 
plant taken over by water authority Essan. 
China  Da Chang 
(Shangai) 
2004 Thames  W BOT. Thames Water abandoned its Da Chang BOT treatment 
plant after the Chinese government declared that the municipal 
guarantee of a 16 per cent profit was invalid. No report of 
compensation paid. 
China  Shenyang  2002 Suez  T BOT. Terminated, council could not afford to pay 
Colombia  Bogota  2004 Suez  T BOT. The Salitre wastewater BOT was terminated after the city 
council calculated that the project was charging ten times too 
much, and that it was worth paying US$ 80 million to buy out 
the contract.   
Estonia Tallinn 2009 United 
Utilities 
C City council refers profit rate of return to competition 
commission which rules it is double the acceptable level. Council 
seeks revision or termination. 
France  Grenoble  2000 Suez  T Operating contract renegotiated into joint venture with 
commune. Terminated after 2 court cases  
France  Paris  2009 Suez, Veolia TE Re-municipalised at expiry by decision of Paris city council.  
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Gambia    1995 Veolia T The Veolia contract was terminated by government on grounds 
of poor performance. No reports of compensation paid.   
Germany  Potsdam  2000 Suez  T With agreed but undisclosed compensation and agreement to 
contract works to Suez  
Hungary  Pecs  2009 Suez  C Attempted termination 2004. Dropped after court case for 
compensation. New attempt October 2009. 
Indonesia  Jakarta  2001 Suez, 
Thames 
RS Renegotiation protected payments to companies and rate of 
return. Partially sold by Suez, 98% sold by Thames. 
Malaysia  states 2009   TR Malaysian government policy to renationalise all water assets 
and revise or terminate existing concession agreements. 
Mali  Bamako  2005 SAUR T The SAUR contract was terminated by government on grounds 
of poor performance. No reports of compensation.  
Philippines  Manila  2005 Suez, 
United 
Utilities 
TR
S 
Many conflicts with regulator. Maynilad Water (Suez) was 
bankrupt, bailed out by re-nationalisation, state funds, reduced 
targets, and higher prices, and then 84% sold to a new private 
equity/ construction joint venture.  Manila Water (United 
Utilities) floated on stock exchange, now mostly owned by 
Ayala. Continuing problems over prices and investment. 
South 
Africa  
Amahthali 
(Stutterheim) 
2005 Suez  T Contract taken over by municipal water company 
South 
Africa  
Johannesburg    Suez  TE Management contract, not renewed 
South 
Africa  
Nkonkobe (Fort 
Beaufort) 
2002 Suez  T City council won court ruling invalidating the contract. 
Tanzania  Dar-es-Salaam 2005 Biwater T Terminated by government on grounds of poor performance. 
Biwater filed two compensation claims in front of two different 
international arbitration tribunals and lost both cases. It lost the 
case filed in front of the UK High Court under UNCITRAL rules 
(on grounds of early termination of the contract) and was 
condemned to pay GBP 3 million in damages, which Biwater 
refused to pay. It also lost the case filed in front of an ICSID 
tribunal on grounds of expropriation. The ICSID tribunal “found 
that while Tanzania’s government had violated its bilateral 
investment treaty with the UK on four separate counts 
(including the unlawful expropriation of assets from Biwater’s 
local JV City Water), the company is not entitled to 
compensation because the value of its investment in City Water 
was nil at the time of the expropriation”. 
Turkey  Antalya  2002 Suez  T Suez subsidiary made bankrupt after price increase refused, 
municipality took over. 
Uruguay  Aguas de la 
Costa 
2006 Suez  T Suez left after reaching an amicable settlement with the 
government and selling its shares. 
Uruguay  URAGUA 2006 Urbaser T Urbaser and Aguas de Bilbao filed a compensation claim in front 
of ICSID and the case is still pending. No payment has been 
made. 
USA  Atlanta  2003 Suez  T Amicable settlement forbids Atlanta mayor and city councillors 
to criticise Suez in public and provides for a payment of US$ 13.3 
million to Suez, due to “transition costs”. Technically, this is not 
paid as compensation.  
 
 
In order to understand these processes, it is necessary to identify the objectives of the companies on the one 
hand, and of governments and cities on the other hand.   
3.4. Company tactics: compensation claims and political pressures 
For the companies, the objective is to achieve one of two results: 
- either, to terminate the contract on the most favourable possible terms – i.e. with maximum 
compensation, or minimum  payment of damages, and minimum damage to the company reputation;  
- or, alternatively, to renegotiate the contract so that it delivers a return on capital which is both high 
and secure from various risks, including political 
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There are two principle tactics used by multinational companies in  
 
Companies use compensation claims to courts or arbitration tribunals as tactical bargaining moves. The tactic 
is most often used when governments (or city councils) attempt to terminate a contract(e.g. Buenos Aires, La 
Paz/El Alto, Dar es Salaam) , or alter a contract, or  impose regulatory sanctions  (e.g. Arezzo, Italy).  The 
company objective is to deter the government/city from taking the proposed action, or to negotiate a better 
deal than they could without the threat of arbitration. The tactical nature of these claims can be clearly seen 
in cases where claims have been submitted, then dropped or suspended while negotiations take place, and 
then reactivated if companies think that negotiations are not going well for them (e.g. Buenos Aires and 
Mendoza, both in Argentina).  
 
In the majority of cases, however, even when an arbitration award is made, this does not invariably result in 
a government paying compensation. One reason for this is that companies do not always win arbitration 
cases e.g. Dar-es-Salaam where Biwater lost in two cases, under both UNCITRAL and ICSID arbitration 
rules.    Another factor is that countries do not always accept the rulings e.g. Argentina has refused to 
recognise any ICSID awards, and in May 2007 Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba decided to leave 
ICSID. Companies may do the same: in the Dar-es-Salaam case, the Tanzanian government said it would 
refuse to recognise an UNCITRAL award;   when the government won the case, the multinational Biwater 
said it would not pay damages to Tanzania because the subsidiary company had been liquidated.  
 
One tactic is exaggerating claims to scare and to maximise possible return. The actual amount of 
compensation awarded varies; even when an arbitration tribunal finds in their favour, the award may be less 
than 30% of the original claim (e.g. Tucuman, Argentina; Azurix in the Province of Buenos Aires, 
Argentina) or a token amount (in Cochabamba, it involved  no more than  2 Bolivian pesos) or nothing (in 
Dar-es-Salaam, even the tribunal which awarded  in Biwater’s favour said that it was not entitled to any 
compensation because the company was worthless.  
 
Arbitration claims (and even awards) are normally dropped as part of a negotiated settlement involving 
termination of the contract. The only cases where companies continue to pursue compensation claims 
regardless of negotiations are those where the company no longer operate in the water sector and so has 
nothing to lose (e.g. Vivendi in Tucuman, Enron/Azurix in Buenos Aires province). Companies are likely to 
want to negotiate a settlement if they want to retain operations in the region or country (e.g. SAUR in 
Mendoza, Argentina); or if they can sell the company more easily without a pending arbitration case (e.g. 
Suez in Cordoba, Buenos Aires and Santa Fe, Argentina); or if they want to protect their international 
reputation, to end damaging campaigns by international civil society (e.g. Bechtel in Cochabamba, Bolivia).  
In other cases compensation has been agreed without arbitration proceedings even starting: e.g. the Salitre 
BOT in Bogota, Colombia; Grenoble, France; Potsdam, Germany; Belize.  
 
The other main category of company tactics is political pressure, through mobilising the embassies of the 
home countries of the multinationals. In Argentina, for example, the companies mobilised the EU to warn 
Argentina against introducing new tighter regulation, on pain of damaging diplomatic relations with Europe. 
In Indonesia, the British ambassador successfully intervened by asking the president to authorise price 
increases requested by the British water company Thames Water. In Hungary, the French, British, German 
and other ambassadors pressured the Hungarian prime minister to denounce the attempt by Pecs to re-
municipalise the water service in 2009.  
3.5. Governments and cities 
For governments and cities, the objectives normally include satisfying citizens and consumers that prices are 
not excessive, that the quality and extent of services are being improved, and that there is little or no cost to 
public finances in terminating or renegotiating the agreement. 
 
It is also possible to identify initiatives and tactics used by governments and citizens. 
 
- Governments or public authorities also withhold payments, refuse price rises, or impose fines as a 
response to persistent non-performance. Refusal to permit price increases was a key measure in 
Buenos Aires, Dar-es-Salaam, Manila and many other cities. The effect of this was not only to make 
the service more affordable to citizens, but also to make the business less profitable and less 
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attractive for the companies, thus triggering re-negotiations or terminations. This was done in 
Antalya, for example, where the private company was then liquidated, and the service taken over by 
the municipality. In Chile, in the case of a badly performing wastewater treatment contract at 
Calama, the regulator simply suspended that portion of the user charge which financed the payments 
to the operator. The company appealed, but lost: the court stated that it would be absurd to support 
the company’s appeal because then “it could provide a bad service at a very low cost [to itself], 
charge full price to users as if it had been paid in good condition.... gaining huge profits”. 15 
- A similar approach is to insist on rewriting the contract to ensure that it is ‘well-balanced’ between 
the interests of the public authorities and those of the company, and/or to insist on introducing 
‘performance-related’ provisions that provide real incentives and penalties for the  private company.  
This has been done recently in a number of contracts in Russia, where existing lease contracts were 
rewritten in this way, supported by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which 
made these revisions a condition of its loans. 16 
- Independent audits have been used in a number of cases, for example La Paz, as a way of both 
confirming and publicising a government’s criticisms of a company, supporting fines or price 
reductions, countering a company’s claim for compensation. Similar audits are now being 
commissioned by the government of Gabon in Africa,17 and the provinces of Mendoza and Santa Fe 
in Argentina. 
- Regulatory bodies played a significant role. In La Paz, Buenos Aires and Manila they published or 
commissioned reviews of performance, imposed fines for non-performance and/or recommended 
against price rises.  In Paris, reform of the regulatory body to establish public accountability was the 
first stage in the process. 
- Consumers and other groups have been key players in terms of making public complaints about 
performance (e.g. in Dar-es-Salaam), participating in demonstrations and other action (e.g. in La 
Paz), bringing court cases against the private operator (e.g. in Buenos Aires, Manila), and 
campaigning and making submissions to the ICSID cases (e.g. in Cochabamba, Buenos Aires, Dar-
es-Salaam). 
3.6. Outcomes: re-municipalisation or nationalisation 
The public authorities have nationalised or municipalised in the great majority of cases. In four of the five 
capital cities - Buenos Aires, Paris, Dar-es-Salaam, and La Paz - this was the final result. In the case of 
Manila one of the companies, Maynilad, was renationalised, restructured with extra state aid and a contract 
more favourable to the private company, and the government then sold its shares in the company to new 
investors (a similar process happened in Belize). The act of nationalisation sometimes happens as the first 
move in the sequence of events – for example in Dar-es-Salaam,  Atlanta and La Paz; sometimes as an 
initiative during the bargaining processes – as in Buenos Aires; but usually as the final step, either 
implementing an agreed termination or as a way of imposing a termination. In Malaysia, the government 
policy is to systematically renationalise all the assets of the state water services, terminating existing private 
concessions, reducing allowable price increases,  and negotiating compensation, financed by a RM20 billion 
sukuk bond issuance (USD $5.9billion).18 
 
The creation of a new public water service can involve a long process of preparation. In particular, there is a 
need to address issues of staff transfer, organisational capacity, and economic benefits: 
It involves transferring existing staff of the private contractor to the new public operator, which may 
involve detailed negotiations, as was the case in Paris, for example.  
The new organisation may need technical assistance to develop capacity: in Dar-es-Salaam, this was 
provided through a public-public partnership (PUP – see next section) with Uganda’s NWSC, which 
provided training and consultancy, resulting in an immediate improvement in performance.  
The creation of a new public sector service out of a terminated private concession clearly involves 
costs, but an assessment of the overall economic impact invariably shows that these costs are far 
outweighed by the savings on tendering and monitoring, lower costs of capital, and the 
developmental and democratic advantages of the flexibility in a directly controlled service. This 
cost-benefit analysis was central to the decision by Paris to re-municipalise rather than renegotiate. 
3.7. Public-public partnerships (PUPs)19 
Water operators need to be efficient, accountable, honest public institutions providing a universal service. 
Many water services however lack the institutional strength, the human resources, the technical expertise and 
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equipment, or the financial or managerial capacity to provide these services. They need support to develop 
these capacities. A growing number of public sector water companies have been engaged, in a great variety 
of ways, in helping others develop the capacity to be effective and accountable public services. These 
supportive arrangements are now called “public-public partnerships” (PUPs).  A public-public partnership 
(PUP) is simply a collaboration between two or more public authorities or organisations, based on solidarity, 
to improve the capacity and effectiveness of one partner in providing public water or sanitation services. 
They have been described as: “a peer relationship forged around common values and objectives, which 
exclude profit-seeking”.20  A great advantage of PUPs is that they avoid the risks of private partnerships: 
transaction costs, contract failure, renegotiation, and the complexities of regulation, commercial 
opportunism, monopoly pricing, commercial secrecy, currency risk, and lack of public legitimacy.21   
 
PUPs are not merely an abstract concept.  In the last 20 years there have been over 130 PUPs in around 70 
countries, in all regions of the world.  This means that far more countries have hosted PUPs than host PPPs 
in water (according to a report from PPIAF in December 2008, there are only 44 countries with any kind of 
private participation in water). The earliest PUPs date to the 1980s, when the Yokohama Waterworks Bureau 
first started partnerships to help train staff in other Asian countries.  Many of the PUP projects have been 
initiated in the last few years, a result of the growing recognition of PUPs as a tool for achieving 
improvements in public water management.  
 
From 2010 the European Commission will provide up to €40 million Euros to finance PUPs involving EU 
public sector water operators and partners in developing countries. For further information on PUPs see 
http://www.psiru.org/reports/2009-03-W-PUPS.doc .  
 
 
4. The Jakarta water contract  
The preceding sections show that the problems of private water concessions are widespread; that public 
sector operation is normal; that many private contracts have been terminated, or are subject to continuing 
bargaining processes over economic and public health issues; and that public-public partnerships are often 
used to develop public sector provision.  
 
Against this background, this section examines the problems associated with the Jakarta water concession, 
sets them in the context of global trends and experience, and considers possible courses of action by the city. 
The review of the issues draws on two major source documents.22  
4.1. Problems with contract and performance 
The contracts originated as political acts of the Suharto regime. The process started with a letter from 
President Suharto in 1995, and ended with two companies being appointed in 1997, without any competitive 
tendering. The corruption in this process was visible in the original share allocations: the British firm 
Thames Water allocated shares to a firm owned by the son of the president, the French company Suez 
Lyonnaise des Eaux allocated shares to a firm owned by a crony of Suharto. After the fall of Suharto in 
1998, these allocations were rapidly reduced. (CR pp2-3)  
 
Like many privatised water contracts, the Jakarta contracts were revised in 2001 in order to make it easier for 
the companies. This was because the private companies were unable to make sufficient profits and achieve 
the targets of the original contracts. The revisions reduced the targets for coverage and non-revenue water to 
levels below what was achieved by PAM Jaya in 1995, and even the new targets are weakened by various 
exceptions and flexibility clauses. (FTY pp. 54-66; CR pp. 9-10). 
 
The 2001 revisions also created a new system for payment of the companies, which can best be described as 
a ‘cost-plus’ contract with guaranteed profits. The companies are paid according to their costs, protected 
against inflation, interest rates, foreign exchange rate and even tax changes (FTY p.94). These include a 
‘know-how’ fee, or management fee, which is typical of water concessions; a World Bank paper noted that 
the effect of these ‘management fees’ is to provide a guaranteed dividend for the owners of the operating 
companies. In addition, the charge is calculated to provide a guaranteed return on capital of 22% (CA clause 
27.1, schedule 6: CR p.13, FTY pp. 54-66). The tariffs paid by customers are effectively determined by these 
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charges, so that if these tariffs are held down to make them affordable, the deficit has to be covered by the 
public authorities, not by the operators.  
 
The overall objectives of the contract still refer to ‘comprehensive coverage…substantial 
extension….increase efficiency…. ensure the quantity, quality and continuity of supply of clean water and 
potable water… to meet the technical target and service standards…. to reduce the quantity of unaccounted 
for water…..’ (CA2001 art 2.2; CR pp6-7). But the actual performance of the companies is very poor. There 
has been little extension of the network, with the lowest level of coverage of major Asian cities; the price per 
cubic meter of water is the highest of any major Asian city; in terms of quality, the water coming out of the 
taps must be boiled; in terms of efficiency, non-revenue water remains over 50% (FTY pp. 5, 105-137). 
   
4.2. Problems in context 
The contract revisions of 2001 created a distinct set of problems. There are no effective incentives, as the 
company’s payments and indeed their rate of return are effectively guaranteed under the contract. The 
companies’ poor performance record has certainly not been helped by such a contract.  
 
It is therefore tempting to address the problem by trying to reform the contract. However, there are three 
factors which must be borne in mind.  
 
Firstly, the performance problems are not unique to Jakarta. As the section on terminations shows, many 
other cities which have privatised water have also experienced the same combination of high prices, low 
investment, no efficiency improvements, and poor performance on leakage, and it is now recognised even by 
former supporters of water privatisation that it is ‘an experiment which failed’.23 The experience of many 
cities is that solving the performance problems requires replacing the private contractor with a public sector 
operator.  
 
Secondly, as many of these cities found, it may not be possible to revise contracts so that they are profitable 
enough for the companies, and at the same time deliver the public interest objectives – lower prices, greater 
investment in extensions and efficiency. In any case, companies will demand compensation for an 
unfavourable revision of a contract as much as they would for termination.  
 
Thirdly, if a contract is terminated, a public sector operation needs to be re-established. This should be 
planned for at an early stage, as the necessary capacity-building may take some time. The growth in PUPs is 
of potential assistance in this process. 
4.3. Possible actions by the city 
Five broad types of action are clearly worth considering: 
• Commission an independent audit on technical, financial, social, economic, environmental and 
accountability impact of the concessions. This should assess how much the Jakarta water concession 
is actually costing, including the costs of receiving a poor service. This assessment is vital for 
assessing the city’s potential claims or liabilities in negotiation with the companies.    
• Examine the possible legal grounds for challenges in court by governments or consumers to the 
provisions of the contract or the actions of the companies 
• Announce termination for breach of contract/unsatisfactory performance, or unilateral insistence on 
revision or termination  
• Encourage public campaigns, both national and international, both to put pressure on the companies 
and demonstrate political responsiveness  
• Plan to create a public sector operator, identifying capacity needs and staff transfer issues, potential 
PUP partners, and potential sources of finance for such a PUP 
• Develop a new business plan, including investment and connection targets, and identify 
potential/optimal sources of finance. 
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